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Back to the Future: Reflections 
on the Advent of Autonomous 
Weapons Systems 
Michael A. Newton1 
This essay refocuses the debate over autonomous weapons 
systems to consider the potentially salutary effects of the 
evolving technology. Law does not exist in a vacuum and cannot 
evolve in the abstract. Jus in bello norms should be developed in 
light of the overarching humanitarian goals, particularly since 
such weapons are not “inherently unlawful or unethical” in all 
circumstances. This essay considers whether a preemptive ban 
on autonomous weapons systems is likely to be effective and 
enforceable. It examines the grounds potentially justifying a 
preemptive ban, concluding that there is little evidence that such 
a ban would advance humanitarian goals because of a 
foreseeable lack of complete adherence. The essay concludes by 
suggesting three affirmative values that would be served by fully 
vetted and field-tested technological advances represented by 
autonomous weapons. Properly developed and deployed, 
autonomous weapons might well advance the core purposes of 
jus in bello by helping the balance the twin imperatives of 
military necessity and humanitarian interests. 
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I. Introduction 
The prospect of autonomous weapons as a regularized feature of 
future wars poses existential implications for the entire field of law 
regulating the use of force. Such autonomous weapons may over time 
become so commonplace and so uncontrollable that the idea of human 
decision-making, based on good faith efforts to comply with legal 
norms, as an outer limit to war making becomes eviscerated. At the 
time of this writing, autonomous weapons thus face pre-demonization 
aimed at freezing development or proliferation. Proponents of a 
complete ban on autonomous weapons frame the issue as centering on 
the prohibition of so called “killer robots.”2 This notion admittedly 
strikes a visceral nerve among the public at large, not to mention 
military experts and ethicists. The law of war is an inescapable aspect 
of the dialogue among people of good conscience who appreciate the 
awful consequences inherent in the waging of modern wars. For those 
seeking a preemptory ban on autonomous systems, such unease 
overshadows the costs of failing to explore the limits of technology or 
develop a full understanding of the information interface between 
humans and autonomous weapons that might well alter the ethical 
compass.  
Indeed, the Secretary General of the United Nations questioned 
whether it can ever be “morally acceptable to delegate decisions about 
the use of lethal force to such systems” and wondered aloud whether 
the lack of individual culpability against a machine launching lethal 
force would ever make it “legal or ethical to deploy such systems.”3 
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the subject goes a step further to 
specifically recommend an immediate “national moratorium on at 
least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, 
deployment of LARs [lethal autonomous robotics] until such time as 
an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of LARs has 
been established.”4 When the debate is framed as one in which 
 
2. Acknowledging the implicit power of this argument, the U.S. 
Department of Defense seeks to assure scholars and practitioners that 
“for a significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger 
or launch a missile from an unmanned system will not be fully 
automated, but it will remain under the full control of a human 
operator.” U.S. DEF. DEP’T, FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
ROADMAP 10 (2009). 
3. UN Meeting Targets ‘Killer Robots,’ UN NEWS (May 14, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47794#.VOCz8LDF-
f9. 
4. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions, Annual Rep. on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/23/47, ¶ 113 (April 9, 2013) (by Christof 
Heyns). 
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“tireless war machines” hold the potential to “take decisions of life or 
death out of human hands,”5 such concerns seem eminently 
appropriate for preserving the integrity of international efforts to 
protect innocent lives during conflicts. 
This short essay nevertheless aims to refocus the debate. Law 
does not exist in a vacuum. Legal norms always operate in synergy 
with changing contexts and often rapidly emerging challenges. They 
establish societal expectations and shape correlative rights in 
accordance with the shared experiences of other states. The 
experience of warfighters is an essential component of the effort to 
regulate armed conflicts. As with any emerging technology for waging 
war, the legal regime serves to reinforce accepted value structures. In 
perhaps his most famous observation, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
noted that  
“the life of the law has never been logic: it has been experience. 
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and 
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their 
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do with the syllogism 
in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”6  
Because normative shifts in the law never serve as a complete 
tabula rasa, they, as well as the policy preferences that animate such 
legal reforms, do not march with the linear certainty of mathematical 
extrapolation or algebraic formulae. They move instead in episodic 
response to shifting valuations and perceptions in light of the ever-
changing tide of human events and the inevitable technological 
innovations that have shaped our world since the Enlightenment.  
This essay will question the overall validity of the legal 
assumptions marshalled to support a preemptive ban on autonomous 
weapons. It concludes by postulating some salutary purposes that 
could be served by the development of lethal autonomous 
technologies, or at a minimum could guide future research in order to 
solve some of the most vexing issues the warrior faces in modern 
combat. Autonomous weapons platforms that operate in conformity 
with international humanitarian law could actually advance 
compliance with the law in the aggregate, as well as minimizing the 
human costs of conflict. This essay will first consider the arguments 
for a preemptive ban and conclude by postulating three possible 
contributions to legal norms of fielded autonomous weapons. Such 
salutary considerations have been almost entirely avoided in the 
passionate positions already staked out. Given the seemingly 
inevitable pace of technological change, it seems most opportune to 
 
5. Id. at ¶¶ 109–10. 
6. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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think prospectively about the affirmative role that autonomous 
weapons could serve in actually reinforcing compliance with the laws 
and customs of warfare, rather than simply assuming that they 
cannot be compatible. If we know anything about the pace of 
technological innovation over the past two decades, we should 
recognize that it proceeds far faster than preconceptions will predict. 
An affirmative vision of how to make technology serve larger societal 
interests is much more salutary when it is articulated early enough to 
actually shape innovation to serve social goals, rather than forcing 
legal and social norms to mold around newly fielded technologies. So 
it should be with the interface between autonomous weapons systems 
and the laws and customs of warfare. 
II. The Law and Technological Adaptation 
At the outset, it must be understood that the campaign for a 
moratorium on all autonomous weapons systems must be assessed 
against the backdrop of personalities and politics. Some of the same 
people that championed the 1997 Ottawa Convention,7 banning the 
use, production, or transfer of anti-personnel landmines, figure 
prominently in the similar efforts regarding autonomous weapons. The 
game is the same, but played on a different field before a different 
audience and with different rules. The minimal decline in landmine 
use worldwide over the past two decades,8 and the devastating spread 
of improvised explosive devices (which are their functional 
equivalent),9 should provide an instructive and cautionary exemplar 
when advocates automatically assume the utility of a total ban on 
autonomous weapons systems. Total bans have never been wholly 
effective in changing state practice as a standalone matter. This is 
partially true because there will always be an incentive for some 
actors to gain disproportionate advantages by ignoring such 
 
7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.  
8. Sharp Drop in Landmine Casualties; But International Funding for 
Remaining Mine Clearance Declines, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN 
LANDMINES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-
events/news/2014/landmine-monitor-2014-launch.aspx (noting that 
while deaths resulting from landmines have dropped to their lowest 
levels since tracking began in 1999, fifty-six states still have active 
landmines).  
9. Peter W. Singer, The Evolution of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 
BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/articles/2012/02/improvised-explosive-devices-singer.  
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constraints.10 Similarly, the strident movement for a moratorium on 
the development or deployment of autonomous weapons is squarely 
situated against the international angst caused by the widespread use 
of drones to strike enemies of the United States on foreign soil 
without the public expression of support by the affected sovereign 
state. The push for a ban on autonomous weapons has at times had 
the flavor of a politicized push to punish the United States for its 
controversial use of extraterritorial drone strikes.11 There is a strong 
waft of politics that cannot be entirely disentangled from the legal 
posturing. Legal evolution never serves as a tabula rasa; thus, the 
lawyer/counselor must be as objective as possible in framing the 
issues based on law and precedent rather than passion and politics. 
In this vein, the history of the law of armed conflict itself provides 
reason to believe that the law will adapt as needed in the wake of 
technological innovation. Throughout its history, jus in bello12 has 
adapted at the precise points of friction with changing technology in 
order to reinforce the validity of legal regulation, while preserving the 
ability to wage war lawfully. Esteemed scholars have advocated 
precisely this view on the basis that autonomous weapons “are not 
inherently unlawful or unethical,” and that their responsible and 
effective use can conceivably be situated within a modified 
understanding of legal and ethical norms.13 It cannot be overstated 
that the moral tension between evolving technology and the 
application of the precise legal rules designed to minimize the cruelty 
and inhumanity during conflict represents one of the enduring threads 
within the field. Shifting legal norms have always echoed a strand of 
Just War thinking that has sought to define the proper bounds for 
waging war.14 St. Augustine wrote that peace “is not sought in order 
to provoke war, but war is waged in order to attain peace. Be a 
peacemaker, then, even by fighting, so that through your victory you 
might bring those whom you defeated to the advantages of peace.”15  
 
10. Steven Groves & Ted R. Bromund, The Ottawa Mine Ban Convention: 
Unacceptable on Substance and Process, 2496 BACKGROUNDER 1, 20 
(2010).  
11. Larisa Epatko, Controversy Surrounds Increased Use of U.S. Drone 
Strikes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/rundown/2011/10/drone-strikes-1.html.  
12. Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, 37 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 553, 553–62 (1997)  
13. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Op-Ed., Killer Robots and the 
Laws of War, WALL ST. J., NOV. 3, 2013, at A19.  
14. See generally JUST WAR THEORY (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1992) 
(compiling different elements of the theory into a volume).  
15. See ST. AUGUSTINE, AUGUSTINE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 217 (E.M. Atkins 
& R.J. Dodaro eds., 2004). 
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Law and technology have operated in a healthy tension with each 
other that over time creates a new equilibrium. Among many other 
illustrative examples of this phenomenon, the Second Lateran Council 
sought to ban the crossbow from medieval battlefields as anathema 
and “hateful to God” because “men of non-knightly order could fell a 
knight.”16 In contrast to preemptive bans on whole classes of weapons, 
the changing pace of technological advancement has more often 
necessitated legal reforms. The effort to ban cross-bows fell into 
desuetude as the invention of firearms using gunpowder for lethal 
purposes obviated efforts to ban cross-bows.17 In a more modern 
example, the law of targeting evolved in response to new technologies 
and the shifting experiences and expectations of the international 
community. Following the World War II bombings of entire cities,18 
current law requires disaggregation of specific targets within a “city, 
town or village or other area containing a similar concentration of 
civilians or civilian objects,” which in turn requires a series of discrete 
distinction and proportionality assessments for each target.19 Jus in 
 
16. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the 
Historical Development of the Law of War, 46 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 3, 
19 (1965). 
17. See TREVOR N. DUPUY, THE EVOLUTION OF WEAPONS AND WARFARE 91 
(1984)  
18. For a succinct history of this era and discussion of the shifts in legal and 
moral thinking over time see BOMBING CIVILIANS: A TWENTIETH-
CENTURY HISTORY (Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B. Young eds., 2009). 
19. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 17512 (which classifies 
such intentional attacks as being per se indiscriminate and therefore 
prohibited) [hereinafter Protocol I]; see also Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Volume II (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). The Official ICRC Commentary to 
Additional Protocol I makes it clear that the provisions of Article 51 
flowed directly from the practices during World War II and the 
reactions thereto:   
 The attacks which form the subject of this paragraph fall under the 
general prohibition of indiscriminate attacks laid down at the beginning 
of paragraph 4. Two types of attack in particular are envisaged here. 
The ‘ first type ‘ includes area bombardment, sometimes known as 
carpet bombing or saturation bombing. It is characteristic of such 
bombing that it destroys all life in a specific area and razes to 
the ground all buildings situated there. There were many examples of 
such bombing during the Second World War, and also during some 
more recent conflicts. Such types of attack have given rise to strong 
public criticism in many countries, and it is understandable that the 
drafters of the Protocol wished to mention it specifically, even though 
such attacks already fall under the general prohibition contained in 
paragraph 4. According to the report of Committee III, the expression 
“bombardment by any method or means” means all attacks by fire-arms 
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bello provides flexible, but not indeterminate, standards that 
automatically expand to suit any new form of warfare.20 And so it has 
been throughout the history of the positivist law; as the tactics for 
warfare have shifted with the advent of new technologies, so has that 
shift necessitated legal innovations to serve the perceived needs of 
nations and preserve the values of humanity.  
At the same time, jus in bello itself has never been infinitely 
malleable based on the individualized will of combatants and the 
convenience of technological superiority. Though laws and customs of 
warfare have a fixed and accepted form in diverse usages, the correct 
application of the legal and moral precepts depends entirely on the 
facts available, the reasonable perceptions of participants, and the 
overall motivations of the decision-makers. Subjective assessments 
that are entirely permissible within the legal framework are always 
bounded by non-negotiable tenets of military necessity and human 
dignity. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 extended this tenet by 
recognizing that “the laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an 
unlimited power in the adoption of means of injuring the enemy.” 21 
The concretized formulation of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided 
a fitting positivist formulation to this developmental arc in specifying 
that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is 
not unlimited.”22 The modern formulation of this foundational 
principle is captured in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I as follows: 
“In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to 
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”23 This same 
spirit animated the judges of the Tokyo District Court to hold that 
the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were disproportionate 
 
or projectiles (except for direct fire by small arms) and the use of any 
type of projectile.  
 INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949  Art. 
51, ¶¶ 1967–68 (Sandoz et al, eds.1987) [hereinafter ADD’L PROTOCOLS 
COMMENT.]. 
20. See Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? 
Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 963, 976. 
21. The Brussels Project of an International Declaration Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War art. 12, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & 
JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 21–28 (2d ed. 1981). 
22. Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, 1907, art. 22, entered into force Jan. 26, 
1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 43, 52 (Adam 
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982) [hereinafter 1907 Hague 
Regulations]. 
23. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 3. 
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in Ryuichi Shimoda et. al. v. The State. 24 The Court discounted 
arguments that the bombings shortened the war, saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives (both military and civilian), and perhaps laid the 
foundation for a modern Japanese state able to enjoy a sustained 
peace by virtue of averting what would have been destruction on a 
vast scale as allied armies advanced across the Home Islands: 
It can be naturally assumed that the use of a new weapon is 
legal, as long as international law does not prohibit it. However, 
the prohibition in this context is to be understood to include 
not only the case where there is an express provision of direct 
prohibition, but also the case where the prohibition can be 
implied . . . from the interpretation and application by analogy 
of existing rules of international law (customary international 
laws and treaties). Further, the prohibition must be understood 
also to include the case where, in the light of principles of 
international law which are the basis of these positive rules of 
international law, the use of new weapons is admitted to be 
contrary to the principles . . . .25 
To summarize, the entire body of the laws and customs of warfare 
represents an evolving compromise between the principles of military 
efficacy and humanity. Shifts in technological capacity, then, require 
application of the laws of warfare “even with respect to weapons that 
did not exist at the time when those principles were affirmed.”26 The 
consistent pattern has been for legal evolution against the backdrop of 
changing tactics and technological innovations, rather than broad 
preemptive proscriptions designed to address shifts in technological 
abilities that can merely be anticipated but not yet ascertained. There 
is no reason to believe that the advent of autonomous weapons would 
be any different. As information about capabilities becomes available 
and tactics adjust accordingly, the legal debates would follow in short 




24. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho (Tokyo Dist. Ct.) Dec. 7 1963, 355 HANREI JIHŌ 
[HANJI] 17(Japan), translated in 8 JAPAN ANN. INT’L L. 212 (1964) 
reprinted in 32 I.L.R. 626 (1994). 
25. Id. at 32 I.L.R. 628–29.  
26. Marina Castellaneta, New Weapons, Old Crimes?, in WAR CRIMES AND 
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES: CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATION AND 
INVESTIGATION 194, 195 (Fausto Pocar, et.al. eds., 2013). 
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III. Autonomous Weapons as the New Legal Frontier
At the same time, some legal scholars have seized on the very 
nature of the legal regime to argue that fully autonomous weapons 
presumptively violate jus in bello as it has already evolved. Judge 
Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, has written that “human rights norms have 
infiltrated the law of war to a significant degree.”27 He traces this 
influence back into the natural law tradition, but its clearest modern 
influence is in the famous Martens Clause that originated in the 1899 
Hague Regulations. The Martens Clause states in its entirety:  
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the 
High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases 
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations 
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity 
and the requirements of the public conscience.28 
The Russian publicist, jurist, and diplomat Fyodor Fyodorovich 
Martens proposed this compromise language as something of a 
diplomatic grab-bag or pressure relief valve to alleviate sharp disputes 
between nations in the negotiations, especially concerning the 
relationship between civilians and combatants.29 The sentiment 
embodied in the Martens Clause would be substantially replicated in 
all four Geneva conventions of 1949,30 Article 1, paragraph 2 of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I,31 and the Preamble of the 1977 Additional 
27. THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2006).
28. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Hague II) pmbl., Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, Treaty Series 403.
29. See Vladimir Vasilievich Pustogaro, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-
1909)—A Humanist of Modern Times, 36 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 300,
311–12 (1996) (detailing the life and achievements of diplomat Fyodor
Fyodorovich Martens).
30. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 63, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 62, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 142,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 158,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
31. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. I, ¶ 2 (“In cases not covered by this
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants
remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
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Protocol II.32 Perhaps because of its evasive but enduring phraseology, 
the Martens Clause has been widely cited by courts, international 
organizations, human rights advocates, tribunals, and individuals. 
Judge Meron summarized that, while the Martens Clause has had far-
reaching effect, he is “far less confident, however, that the Martens 
Clause has had any influence on the battlefield.”33 Its contortions in 
both domestic and international jurisprudence led the late jurist 
Antonio Cassese to say that the Martens Clause has become one of 
the “legal myths of the international community.”34 The Clause 
nevertheless reflected an underlying and enduring consensus that the 
humanitarian aspiration, even in the midst of conflict, cannot be 
completely discounted on the basis of expediency or artful treaty 
drafting. 
Of particular note in the context of efforts to ban autonomous 
weapons systems, the Preamble to the Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention of 1980 (CCW)35 repeats the Martens Clause sentiment 
that “in cases not covered by [international agreements] the civilian 
population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from 
 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of 
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”).  
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection Of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, pmbl, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513 
[hereinafter Protocol II].  
33. MERON, supra note 26, at 28. 
34. Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clauses: Half a Loaf or Pie in the Sky, 
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 188 (2000). 
35. See Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) pmbl., 
October 18, 1907., 205 CTS 264; 1 Bevans 619; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 
24 U.S.T. 564; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol II, supra note 
31 at Article 1;Protocol I, supra note 18 at pmbl., ¶ 2;Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, pmbl., 
CCW/CONF.II/2, 19 I.L.M. 1823 (1980) [hereinafter Convention on 
Prohibitions of Certain Conventional Weapons]. 
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the dictates of public conscience.”36 On its face, this language extends 
well past the original aspiration of the Martens Clause to protect 
civilians resisting occupation. Full exploration of the nuanced 
interconnections between this non-binding Preambular language and 
the body of applicable jus in bello and human rights law is beyond the 
scope of this essay. However, the CCW is, at the time of this writing, 
the locus of international efforts to debate the future for autonomous 
weapons systems. Delegations representing some twenty-seven nations 
and a wide variety of international experts and organizations attended 
the meetings in Geneva held in May 2014 to “discuss the questions 
related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous 
weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention.”37   
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), some experts believe that even if autonomous weapons 
systems can be used in compliance with applicable jus in bello 
provisions, the penumbra of the Martens Clause as echoed in the 
CCW Preamble would constrain the use of machines making life and 
death decisions “with little or no human control.”38 In its official 
statement to the May 2014 meeting of experts in Geneva, the ICRC 
extended this sentiment to conclude that “perhaps the most 
fundamental question is whether autonomous weapon systems are 
compatible with the principles of humanity and the dictates of public 
conscience. There is a deep sense of discomfort with the idea of any 
weapon system that places the use of force beyond human control.”39 
The definitive fit between the unfocused aspirations of the Martens 
Clause and its reincarnation in the CCW Preamble will be determined 
by national delegations in the future. For our purposes, it must be 
noted that there is no diplomatic history nor any evidence of state 
practice since 1899 on which practitioners or policy makers could 
anchor a broad ban on development or deployment of autonomous 
weapons systems. Indeed, the Martens concept would be forced to 
bear a wholly unprecedented and unforeseen burden if it becomes the 
fulcrum for forcing a preemptive ban on a developing class of 
 
36. Convention on Prohibitions of Certain Conventional Weapons, pmbl. 
37. See id.  
38. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING ON ‘AUTONOMOUS WEAPON 
SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS’, 
26-28 MARCH 2014, GENEVA 15 (2014). 
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technology. The Martens Clause was simply not intended to be the 
primary weight bearing pillar of international humanitarian law. 
Basing a preemptive ban on weapons on its spare text would therefore 
be unprecedented and unwarranted. 
IV. How Law and Technology Can Develop 
Concurrently 
This essay will conclude by postulating three affirmative values 
that could be enhanced by the development and deployment of 
autonomous weapons systems. Law should indeed conform to social 
experience in light of the most feasible approach to achieving the 
desirable societal goals. As a distinctive field of law, jus in bello can 
only be understood in light of the truism that the established lex lata 
represents a finely honed balance between buttressing the ability of 
war-fighters to accomplish the military mission, even as the extensive 
system of constraints for lawfully doing so seeks to protect human 
lives and civilian property to the greatest degree possible.40 Unlike the 
field of human rights, lethal force in armed conflict is permissible 
whenever reasonably necessary to achieve a military objective absent 
evidence of some prohibited purpose or unlawful tactic.41 In other 
words, jus in bello operates on a presumed permissive basis subject to 
express limitations precisely because it must be applied during 
hostilities by war-fighters as an extension of disciplined 
professionalism even in the midst of mind-numbing fatigue, adrenalin, 
and soul felt fear. The debate over the appropriate role of autonomous 
weapons systems juxtaposed against larger efforts to inculcate 
compliance with international humanitarian law, in part, derives from 
this essential DNA of the field.  
The very purpose of jus in bello is to facilitate the difficult moral 
and legal choices that require human judgment in order to preserve 
human dignity and life to the greatest degree possible in light of the 
military mission.42 These purposes could be enhanced by the use of 
autonomous weapons in three distinct ways: 1) they could sharpen the 
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ability of warfighters to distinguish between protected persons and 
property and the subjects of lawful military attack; 2) they could 
provide a significant boost to current obstacles for deterring violations 
during non-international armed conflicts or those waged primarily by 
non-state actors; and 3) they could boost the efforts of law abiding 
nations to defeat adversaries that increasingly resort to urban warfare 
and intentionally commingle with civilian populations. These 
potential goals should be prioritized as research into autonomous 
weapons systems continues, assuming of course that the foreseeable 
technological barriers to the complex decision-making that is an 
integral part of good faith compliance with jus in bello can be 
overcome. 
At a superficial level, the ICRC view is understandable because 
autonomous weapons seem inconsistent with the quintessential 
expressions of the laws and customs of warfare by which objective 
standards are applied from the evaluative perspectives of diverse 
humans caught in the midst of conflict. Jus in bello is permissive by 
its express terms insofar as it defines the limits of lawful authority, 
rather than operating as an affirmative grant of authority. But that 
permissive character in turn relies on the assessments of human 
beings who must conform to the legal standards under shifting 
circumstances and on the basis of incomplete or often inaccurate 
information. Even as there are abundant examples in jus in bello of 
express prohibitions subject to no caveats, combatants exercise what 
the ICRC has labeled a “fairly broad margin of judgment.”43 For 
example, medical care is due those in military custody only “to the 
fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay.”44 
Obligations are repeatedly couched in aspirational terms such as 
“whenever possible”45 or “as widely as possible.”46 Other duties are 
framed in less than strident terms such as “shall endeavor”47 or the 
duty to “take all practical precautions.”48 There are also express 
exceptions permitted for reasons of “imperative military necessity.”49  
The fine-grained and context-specific reasoning necessitated by 
these legal standards seems almost unimaginable in the hands of a 
computer programmed weapons platform. At the same time, who 
would have anticipated the internet at the time the 1977 Additional 
Protocols were negotiated, or satellite communications, or 
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49. Id. at art. 55(5). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Reflections on the Advent of Autonomous Weapons Systems 
18 
smartphones, or the evolution of digital communications? A broad-
based ban on development and deployment risks short-circuiting new 
technologies that could make such evaluative reasoning free from 
passions, prejudices, or external pressures. Indeed, autonomous 
weapons might actually advance adherence to these legal tenets by 
eliminating information barriers and ensuring instantaneous 
adjustment of tactics across linguistic or cultural boundaries that 
normally divide human military units in wartime. Thus, autonomous 
weapons systems may well be able to statistically enhance compliance 
with established legal norms by facilitating dispassionate compliance 
that is flexible enough to shift almost instantaneously in accordance 
with rapidly changing circumstances that might undermine human 
decision-making in similar contexts.  
The basic law of targeting imposes another seemingly 
insurmountable barrier to compliant computer-powered autonomous 
weapons. For the purposes of proportionality, the most relevant 
permissive duties incumbent on those who order military strikes 
require them to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to 
be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects”50 and “take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack 
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects.”51 As a logical extension, “effective advance warning shall be 
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless 
circumstances do not permit [emphasis added].”52 The commander’s 
actions “must be made in good faith and in view of all information 
that can be said to be reasonably available in the specific situation” 
according to the ICRC.53 This seemingly requires human judgment 
and human assessment rather than automated programming. This 
permissive jus in bello framing empowers those in the vortex of battle 
to balance the legitimate military needs against larger humanitarian 
imperatives. It is important to note that the benchmark for what is 
“feasible” is measured from the reasonable war-fighter’s point of view. 
In fact, modern international criminal law expressly preserves broad 
discretionary authority. 
For example, Article 23 of the 1899 Hague II Convention stated 
that it was forbidden “[t]o destroy or seize the enemy’s property, 
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
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necessities of war.”54 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court repeated that same language in Articles 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 
8(2)(e)(xii)(respectively applicable during international and non-
international armed conflicts).55 Based on their belief that the concept 
of military necessity ought to be an unacceptable component of 
military decision-making, some civilian delegates sought to introduce 
a higher subjective threshold by which to second-guess military 
operations.56 They proposed a verbal formula for the Elements of 
Crimes that any seizure of civilian property would be valid only if 
based on “imperative military necessity.”57 There is no evidence in the 
traveaux of the Rome Statute that its drafters intended to alter the 
preexisting fabric of the laws and customs of war.58 Introducing a 
tiered gradation of military necessity, as proposed, would have built a 
doubly high wall that would have had a paralyzing effect on military 
operations. A double threshold for the established concept of military 
necessity would have clouded the decision-making of commanders and 
soldiers who must balance the legitimate need to accomplish the 
mission against the mandates of the law. In my view, requiring 
“imperative military necessity” as a necessary condition for otherwise 
permissible actions would have introduced a wholly subjective and 
unworkable formulation that would foreseeably have exposed military 
commanders to after-the-fact personal criminal liability for their good 
faith judgments.  
The important point for our purposes is that the twin concepts of 
military necessity and feasibility preserve jus in bello as a practicable 
body of law that balances humanitarian and military considerations, 
at least when applied by reasonable, well-intentioned, and well trained 
humans.59 In our hearts, we simply trust humans more, even as we 
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acknowledge that they must make decisions based on imperfect 
information in suboptimal conditions and often with inadequate 
resources. This understanding helps to explain why advocates of a ban 
are adamant that the role of criminal accountability for flawed 
decision-making is an integral component of jus in bello.60 Machines 
cannot be prosecuted, and the line of actual responsibility to 
programmers or policy makers becomes too attenuated to support 
liability. Of course, such considerations overlook the distinct 
possibility that technological advances may well make adherence to 
established jus in bello duties far more regularized. Information could 
flow across programmed weapons systems in an instantaneous and 
comprehensive manner, and thereby facilitate compliance with the 
normative goals of the laws of war. A preemptive ban on autonomous 
weapons would prevent future policy makers that seek to maximize 
the values embedded in jus in bello from ever being in position to 
make informed choices on whether to use humans or autonomous 
systems for a particular operational task. 
Of course, any sentient observer knows that we do indeed live in a 
flawed and dangerous world. There is little precedent to indicate that 
a complete ban would garner complete adherence. Banning 
autonomous systems might do little more than incentivize asymmetric 
research by states or non-state armed groups that prioritize their own 
military advantage above compliance with the normative framework 
of the law. There has been far too little analysis of the precise ways 
that advancing technology might well serve the interests of law-
abiding states as they work towards regularized compliance with the 
laws and customs of war. Proponents of a complete ban on 
autonomous weapons simply assume technological innovations away, 
and certainly undervalue the benefits of providing some affirmative 
vision of a desired end state to researchers and scientists.  
V. Autonomous Weapons in Compliance with Jus in 
Bello 
This essay concludes by suggesting three plausible and affirmative 
values that could be served by fully vetted and field-tested 
technological advances embedded in deployed autonomous weapons. 
In the first place, the principle of distinction forms the prime directive 
for jus in bello. Combatants must at all times seek to distinguish 
themselves from protected civilians and must direct their warlike 
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actions only against other combatants. This principle is subject to no 
caveats or carve outs.61 Autonomous weapons might well be able to 
advance this eminently desirable objective by focusing lethal violence 
only on the appropriately identified target. Imagine the capability to 
precisely strike the terrorist who is hiding in the midst of human 
shields. It would absolutely be desirable if that could be done without 
causing clearly excessive disproportionate damage to the innocent 
civilian lives and property. Similarly, autonomous weapons might be 
able to sort through the various weapons signatures and precisely 
identify the source of an attack and direct pin-point violence exactly 
where it can only kill or injure those responsible for the attack. To 
reiterate, the instantaneous flow of information across linguistic 
barriers or national boundaries and across military units might well 
have a deterrent effect by making the consequences of military action 
felt with far more immediacy.  
By extension, individual deterrence could well be enhanced by 
autonomous weapons that are able to target individuals based on 
specific features. Incentivizing non-state armed groups to comply with 
the law of war is one of the most insoluble problems facing the field 
today. That is why the dramatic trend in prosecutions over the past 
decade has involved rampant campaigns of criminality committed by 
militias in areas where they feel far removed from any force of law. 
However, imagine that weapons systems are developed and fielded 
that can receive and process the biometric data of the target. Such 
things may already be on the horizon with the development of facial 
recognition software, but no one really knows the limits of technology. 
If biometric data of an individual target is combined with field DNA 
analysis, then discrimination and personal deterrence would be 
advanced to unprecedented levels. For example, Joseph Kony could in 
theory be found and targeted by Ugandan authorities even as he hides 
in the jungle. Autonomous weapons might be able to go places where 
humans cannot and to use force with more precision and far greater 
personal focus than was ever possible. Autonomous weapons systems 
might even be able to cancel an attack if the computer identifies an 
incorrect target on the basis of eyeball scans or other unique 
biometric “signatures.” This might be the most effective form of 
deterrence because a tireless machine would not rest until a particular 
perpetrator was either immobilized or killed. Such personal deterrence 
represents the gaping hole in current compliance efforts.  
Autonomous weapons systems could conceptually be the key to 
conducting urban warfare that is both effective militarily and far 
more compatible with the goals of jus in bello. As much of the world’s 
population centralizes in large urban centers, and non-state actors 
increasingly seek to use urban areas as the locus of military 
61. Protocol I, supra note 18, at art.44. 3.
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operations, current tactics have lagged behind. Westernized forces 
that want to minimize damage to civilian lives and property are 
increasingly confronted with adversaries that seek sanctuary among 
civilians.62 Participants in conflict that are intertwined with civilian 
populations cannot be rooted out with conventional bombs or 
missiles, and street-to-street fighting endangers many more civilians. 
Fielding of tailored autonomous weapons systems that can be 
activated at times and areas seeking to strike insurgents, and not 
civilians, may hold great promise. This seems fanciful at present, but 
who would have foreseen GPS watches or the evolution of satellite 
radio when vacuum tube televisions were still the rage?  
Technology should be the servant of society and not its 
antagonist. Prospectively seeking technological innovation that 
enhances compliance with jus in bello, rather than endangering its 
viability, seems far more advisable than a preemptive ban. Sound 
policy seldom proceeds from assumptions and aspersions. This is not 
an unprecedented problem in the context of warfare. Lt . Gen. Sir Ian 
Hamilton, for example, summarized the difficulty of accurate battle 
history in the Preface to his own observer’s diary of the Russo-
Japanese War, entitled A Staff Officer ‘s Scrap Book. His concluding 
thought is often quoted out of context,63 but the longer text of his 
1905 comment is more than apropos to our discussion of autonomous 
weapons systems: 
If facts are hurriedly issued, fresh from the mint of battle, they 
cannot be expected to supply an account which is either well 
balanced or exhaustive. On the other hand, it is equally certain 
that, when once the fight has been fairly lost or won, it is the 
tendency of all ranks to combine and recast the story of their 
achievement into a shape which shall satisfy the susceptibilities 
of national and regimental vain-glory. It is then already too late 
for the painstaking historian to set to work. He may record the 
orders given and the movements which ensued, and he may 
build hopes and fears which dictated those orders, and to the 
spirit and method in which those movements were executed, he 
has for ever lost the clue. On the actual day of battle naked 
truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following 
morning they have already begun to get into their uniform.64 
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VI. Conclusion
If there is anything we can predict about technological innovation, 
it is that it proceeds unpredictably. The potential for autonomous 
weapons is too immense, and the implications for the future of 
warfare too important to be assumed away or to remain unexplored. 
We should not be afraid of technology but should always seek to 
harness its development in ways that seem most suitable for human 
purposes. Any preemptive ban would be the result of a long 
diplomatic process and thus a suboptimal negotiated text that would 
be implemented only intermittently and undermined at will by 
motivated state or non-state actors. Thus, policymakers and those 
who seek to enhance the goals of jus in bello would be well served to 
advocate for focused research efforts that seek to overcome some of 
the most pressing problems facing the field. Compliance with the laws 
and customs of warfare cannot be cut and pasted into the thinking of 
practitioners and lawyers across contexts. We ought, therefore, to 
think critically and carefully about the role and relevance of 
autonomous weapons and to guide their development so that they 
advance the core purposes of jus in bello. Properly developed and 
deployed, autonomous weapons systems could in fact strengthen 
compliance with the law by reinforcing its laudatory goals: Balance, 
symmetry, military effectiveness, and, perhaps most of all, the 
enduring interests of humanity. 

